

Simulation of Adversarial Scenarios in OMNeT++

Putting Adversarial Queueing Theory from Its
Head to Feet

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Introduction

1 Introduction

2 Adversarial Queueing

3 Simulation Results

4 Challenges and Future Work

Overview

Adversarial Queueing Theory (AQT) studies hypothetical worst-case queueing scenarios.


- What we did → simulation of AQT scenarios
- Why simulation → study, new insights, and communicate
- Results → e.g. on bound tightness, robustness

Goal of this talk

- 1 raise interest for AQT in the simulation community
- 2 establish simulation as complementary method to analysis

Scenario

- imagine a network with the following requirement:
guaranteed delay $\leq 20\text{ms}$




- worst-case delay? \Rightarrow two steps:
 - 1 determine: is a delay guarantee possible
 - 2 if yes: find tight bound (employ network calculus/...)

rough definition

a network is stable \Leftrightarrow a finite bound on delay exists

Scenario

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



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rough definition

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Contribution



- framework to capture adversarial traffic description
 - ▣ in short: packet trajectories, and adversarial strategies
- implementation of some classical AQT scenarios
- interpretation of some of the results
 - ▣ modeling assumptions, bound tightness, parameter interaction



An open simulator for the Adversarial Queueing framework
<http://disco.informatik.uni-kl.de/content/Aqtmodel>

Adversarial Queueing

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
Network Instability

- network instability is based on inductive constructions
 - recall: mentioned cyclic graphs




- hypothetical adversary (cf. online algorithms)
 - can inject anywhere and can choose packet trajectory
 - adversary's goal: maximize stress on network
- injections are subject to a leaky-bucket constraint (e.g.):
for any edge: sum of injections in $[t_1, t_2] \leq r(t_2 - t_1) + b$
- $r <$ edge capacity

⇒ e.g. this topology is stable:




Example of Inductive Injection Scheme



1. assume a set of red packets queued at e_1


Example of Inductive Injection Scheme



1. assume a set of red packets queued at e_1
2. inject blue packets into e_1 with path (e_1, e_2, e_4)

Example of Inductive Injection Scheme


3.b inject packets into e_2
 \Rightarrow slow down blue packets



1. assume a set of red packets queued at e_1
2. inject blue packets into e_1 with path (e_1, e_2, e_4)
- 3.a inject green packets into e_1 with path (e_1, e_3, e_4) .

Example of Inductive Injection Scheme

3.b inject packets into e_2
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



4. fill queue at e_4 ,
 more injections,
 transfer to e_1 ,
 repeat ...

1. assume a set of red packets queued at e_1
2. inject blue packets into e_1 with path (e_1, e_2, e_4)
- 3.a inject green packets into e_1 with path (e_1, e_3, e_4) .

Effect of Adversarial Injections

- queue of e_4 (and others) experiences repeated bursts
- burst size grows without bound over time
- no upper bound on queue length or delay



- theory seeks exact conditions of stability
- as an engineer: open questions may be different!?


Open Questions

in general:

- how real is the threat?
- so what does it mean?

more specific:

- how long does it take to induce some particular delay?
- countermeasures?
- how realistic are modeling assumptions?
 - perfect time synchronization
 - infinite buffers
 - errors in discretization, rough calculations, bounds, ...
- assumption of initial network state (so-called initial sets)



Simulation Results

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Simulation Results

Case study with four examples


- Baseball (BB), due to Andrews et al., 2001
- Diaz et al., 2001
- graph minor \mathcal{A}^+ , due to Weinard, 2006
- gadget chains, Lotker et al., 2004

Disclaimer

Only exemplary study - may not be universally valid.


- yet, we consider the selection of scenarios representative

Analytical Prediction vs. Simulative Result



Bound Tightness


Gadget Chains, Lotker et al.



Rerandomization

- adversary relies on strictly deterministic synchronization
 - events take place on distinct nodes with exact timing
 - no noise: fixed channel capacity
- we introduce “rerandomization”
 - channel with variable delay
 - every traversal delay is sampled from a Normal distribution
- channel mean delay = deterministic delay
- delay standard deviation e.g. of 5% or 30%

Rerandomization



Challenges and Future Work

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Challenges and Future Work

- high number of nodes, events
 - long execution time
 - simplifying abstraction, modeling error
- approximation
 - parallelism
 - step-wise convergence towards realism
-
- classical challenges in simulation
 - we have great interest to learn from simulation community
 - future work
 - utilize as part of our own theoretic work in AQT
 - develop towards more realistic scenarios
 - e.g. assess the role of cross traffic in the adversary's operation
 - enhance visualization

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
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Slides will be available:

<http://disco.informatik.uni-kl.de/software/AQTmodel/SlidesOMNeT2013.pdf>

Rerandomization Detailed Operation



Interaction of Initial Sets with Injection Rate

